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Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse land allocation between competing agri-environmental 
contracts taking into account institutional issues and farm household and farm characteristics. We 
consider a Biodiversity Protection Contract, Landscape Management Contract and a Restriction on 
Intensive Practises Contract. The paper shows that it is important to study the choice for an agri-
environmental contract in combination with the choice for other agri-environmental contracts. The 
reasons being that a unit of land can only be allocated to one contract (although a farm can select 
more than one contract) and perceived relative marginal costs of contracts can change if institutional 
settings and farm household and farm characteristics alter. The model uses a two stage method. In the 
first step the probability of contract choice is determined. In the second stage these probabilities are 
linked to ex ante costs (including transaction costs) and optimal contract choice is determined. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
In the European Union (EU), the purpose of agri-environmental schemes (AES) is to promote a more 
environmental friendly way of farming. A mix of agri-environmental measures is often brought 
together in an agri-environmental contract to address one or more environmental objectives. These 
measures generally complement each other, but they can conflict internally within the mix and 
externally with other agri-environmental policies (Jones, 2005; 44). A basic principle of agri-
environmental contracts in the EU is that they are optional for farmers. The basic idea is that this 
promotes constructive cooperation and a positive attitude to wildlife and landscape on the part of 
farmers, in respect it has an advantage over statutory environmental obligations (European 
Commission, 2005: 9). Member states have a wide degree of discretion in how to implement agri-
environmental contracts (European Commission, 2005: 9). This means that institutional issues within 
member states as well as attitudes have a great influence on agri-environmental contracts’ uptake and 
their environmental effectiveness. Policy makers aiming at improving the agri-environment have an 
interest in the reasons why farms choose a specific agri-environmental contract, or why they do not 
contract, in order to design contracts that increase contracting. 
To analyse contract choice several studies focus on the characteristics of farms and farmers that 
conclude agri-environmental contracts, e.g. Crabtree et al. (1998); Beedell and Rehman (2000); 
Wenum (2002); and Wynn et al. (2001). These studies typically use logit or probit models. Van 
Huylenbroeck et al. (2000) and Peerlings and Polman (2004) developed simulation models to evaluate 
the impact of agri-environmental programmes on production and economic results of dairy farms in 
order to better explain contract choice. The first group of studies is not able to determine how much 
land is contracted, the latter two studies fail to include institutional issues and farm household 
characteristics in their models. None of the studies explicitly analyses how contracts compete. 
Competition comes from the fact that a farm can only choose one contract on a unit of land while it 
can conclude more than one contract. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse agri-environmental contract uptake taking into account 
institutional issues, farm and farmers’ characteristics and competition between contracts1. To reach 
this goal a model that allocates land between competing agri-environmental contracts for individual 
farms will be developed.  
                                                 
1 This document presents results obtained within the EU project SSPE-CT-2003-502070 on Integrated tools to 
design and implemented Agro Environmental Schemes (http//:merlin.lusignan.inra.fr/ITAES). It does not 
necessary reflect the view of the European Union and in no way anticipates the commission’s future policy in 
this area. 
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In the paper we assume that farms maximize utility from profit (income). This profit is earned 
by selecting a mix of different types of contracts (or not contracting). Uptake is assumed to depend on 
the probability that an individual farm will select a specific contract type. Probabilities are derived 
using a multinomial logit model and are assumed to depend on institutional issues and farm and 
farmers’ characteristics. Selecting a contract is assumed to imply allocating land to a specific contract. 
An economic model is used to model land allocation. In this paper three different contract types are 
distinguished: landscape management; biodiversity protection; and restrictions on intensive practices. 
The model is applied to 848 farms in study areas in Belgium, France, Finland, Italy and the 
Netherlands.  
A theoretical model of contract choice is presented in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the data. 
Section 4 discusses the empirical model. Section 5 gives the estimation results. In Section 6 the effect 
of institutional design and contract payments on farm choice between agri-environmental contracts is 
analysed.  Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. Theoretical model 
 
 
The theoretical model is presented in equations 1-6. It is assumed that farms maximise utility (see 
equation 1) derived from the individual contracts selected. Utility from contracting is represented by 
an additive utility function. Selecting a contract implies that farms allocate (part of) their land to that 
contract. If a hectare of land is used for contract A it cannot be used for contract B. However, we will 
assume that more than one contract can be selected by one farm. So the model can be perceived as a 
land allocation model. The utility maximization problem of an individual farm is given by: 
1
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Where:  
iU  utility of farm i; E  expectations operator; siγ  probability that contract s is selected by farm i; siU  
utility of farm i of selecting contract s; F vector of farm’s characteristics; Q vector of farmer’s 
characteristics; I vector of farm’s institutional performance; S vector of farm’s social capital; V vector 
of extension variables; siπ  profit of selecting contract s by farm i; sip  compensation paid for selecting 
1 hectare of land of contract s by farm i; siA  land used for contract s by farm i; siC  total cost of 
contract s by farm i; iA  land availability of farm i. 
 
Equation 2 shows that utility per contract is derived from profit (income) from that contract. 
Not contracting is also seen as a contracting possibility with zero profit. As functional form the 
negative exponential utility function has been selected. This implies utility is an increasing function of 
profit. The increase in marginal utility of profit is decreasing with the level of profit. We ignore here 
profit from other activities.  
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Equation 3 shows that profit from a contract equals revenue minus costs. Revenue equals 
payments per hectare times the number of hectares contracted. Costs of contracting include transaction 
costs, costs of inputs needed to meet the requirements set by the contract (e.g. labour) and opportunity 
costs of production (forgone profit). Unfortunately these costs are unknown in this research. We will 
assume that contract and farm specific cost functions can be specified that depend on the area 
contracted and the probabilities to contract. It is assumed that costs are increasing in area contracted 
and decreasing in the probability to contract. A high probability is assumed to be correlated to low 
(expected) costs of contracting while a low probability is linked to high (expected) costs of 
contracting. Farm characteristics that increase the probability are likely to correlate with low actual 
costs, farmers’ characteristics with perceived costs. Also institutional issues have a link with both 
actual and perceived costs. 
Equation 4 gives the probabilities to select a contract as a function of farm characteristics, 
farmers’ characteristics and institutional issues (see section 3 for a description of the variables). So, 
the probabilities should be interpreted as the probability that given a number of explanatory variables a 
specific contract is chosen. There are two strong assumptions made here. First, the probability to 
contract is also influenced by contract characteristics as contract payment, duration, types of measures, 
etc. these are not taken into account because of lack of information. Contract payments known are 
farm-specific and only known for those contracts a farm already has selected. So if a contract is not 
selected information is lacking. Obtaining contract characteristics is also difficult because the 
contracts considered are actually group of contracts of a certain type. Second, we assume an inverse 
relationship between the probability and costs.  
Equation (5) shows that the total availability of land equals the hectares used under different 
types of contracts (or not contracting). Equation (6) gives the non negativity constraints for land. 
Because utility is increasing in profit the higher the profit the higher the utility. So utility 
maximisation can be replaced by profit maximisation for each individual contract. The optimal amount 
of land contracted by farm i can be found by taking the first order derivatives of equation 3:   
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Where:  
'
si
C  marginal cost of contract s by farm i. 
 
Equation 7 shows that in the profit maximising optimum marginal costs of selecting a contract equal 
the contract payment. Solving equation (7) gives the optimal amount of land allocated to contract s by 
farm i. Substituting the optimal amount of land in the model (equation 1-6) gives profit and utility 
from contracting for each farm. 
 
 
3. Data 
 
 
In 2005, a survey was carried out in specific areas in Belgium, France, Finland, Italy, and the 
Netherlands2. The used questionnaire addresses issues concerning their farm, their perception of agri-
environmental contracts, information on their income, social capital, motivational issues and hobbies. 
In addition several questions were asked to contracting farmers on how they manage their contracts 
and their required farming practices. Contracting farmers were over represented in the sample on 
purpose in order to get better information on agri-environmental contracts. For all these areas 
participants and non-participants were interviewed face to face (990 farmers in total). Response rates 
differ for the regions. In this paper data on 848 farms are used, 236 Belgium, 93 Finnish, 262 French, 
132 Italian and 125 Dutch farms. 
 From the questionnaire several variables were constructed. They describe the farming family 
(education level and age), their production system (farm legal status, farms size in Standard Gross 
                                                 
2 The survey was carried out within the ITAES project, see footnote 1. 
 5
Margins (SGM3), etc.), the professional environment (involvement in agricultural organizations, the 
use of extension services), social capital (trust and participation in networks). Some variables clearly 
describe the farmer and his farm. These variables serve as control variables. A second set of variables 
focuses on information related variables. The third set addresses the relation with the contracting 
partner (= the government). The final set of variables addresses social capital. Table 1 gives an 
overview of the data used for the estimation. 
 
Table 1.  Overview of data used for estimation, (number of observations = 848), 2005  
 Mean Std. error
Farm characteristics  
Percentage SGM in dairy production 33.3 30.5
Percentage SGM in beef production 1.8 5.3
Farm size in SGM 16.7 45.9
Dummy indicating whether farm is organic 0.9 
Number of technical changes past five years 3.3 1.8
Dummy indicating whether farm is expected to be continued the next 10 years 0.8 
Farmers’ characteristics  
Dummy age farmer between 40-55+ 0.5 
Dummy age farmer older than 55+ 0.2 
Dummy indicating medium education level+ 0.9 
Dummy indicating high education level+ 0.1 
Dummy indicating whether off-farm income is more than 50% of total income 0.3 
Institutional performance and trust  
Score on 6 items related to institutional design4 2.6 0.5
Score indicating the government can be trusted5 2.3 0.6
Dummy indicating AES will remain the same over time6 0.2 
Social capital  
Dummy indicating that most people can be trusted7 0.7 
Dummy indicating the farmer often participates in activities of non-agricultural 
organizations 
0.3 
Dummy indicating the farmer often participates in activities of agricultural 
organizations 
0.5 
Extension services  
Dummy indicating use of public extension 0.6 
Dummy indicating use of private extension 0.7 
 
 
The contracts mentioned are different with respect to operational requirements in the contract. We 
distinguished three types of contracts: focusing on landscape management, biodiversity protection and 
the restriction of intensive practices (see also Bonnieux et al., 2002). Landscape management focuses 
                                                 
3 The standard Gross Margin (SGM) of a crop or livestock item is defined as the value of output from one 
hectare or from one animal less the cost of variable inputs required to produce that output. For each region all 
crop and livestock items are accorded an SGM. To avoid bias caused by fluctuations, e.g. in production (due to 
bad weather) or in input/output prices, three year averages are taken. 
4 Average score on 6 items on a Likert scale  related to institutional design: 
- “The eligibility rules are fair” 
- “The procedures for application are easy” 
- “The rules and requirements are easy to understand” 
- “The intended environmental benefits are clear and easy to understand” 
- “It is easy to find the right person to contact in the administration when there are problems” 
- “Regarding AES, administration behavior is fair and responsible” 
5 “The … can be trusted” where ... stands for average score on trust in agricultural administration, environmental 
administration, and EU (on a Likert scale) 
6 The current policy rules and regulations will remain constant over a longer period. 
7 See footnote 4 where … stands for most people 
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on the maintenance of landscape elements. Biodiversity protection refers to contracts like extensive 
management of grassland and management to promote flora and fauna.  Winter cover on arable land 
and reduced use of fertilizers are examples of the restriction of intensive practices.   
 Farm and farmer characteristics are relevant for the uptake of AES. From previous studies 
follows that farm size and farm type influence the uptake of AES (e.g. Wynn et al, 2001 and 
Vanslembrouck et al., 2002). The type service delivered by the farmer is different depending on 
farming type. Implementing biodiversity protection contract on a specialized dairy farm will be 
different from implementing the same contract on a specialized arable farm. Farmers who develop 
their farm in a direction not related to AES are expected to be less willing to be involved in agri-
environmental contracts. Wynn et al. (2001) show also the importance of the “fit” of the scheme with 
the farm.   
 Based on the literature, we included a number of farmer characteristics in the model (see for 
example, Wilson, 1997). Dummy variables for age and education are added to the model. Reference 
categories for age and education are dropped from the model in order to avoid a dummy trap 
(Woolridge, 2006). Further, a variable for off-farm income is added to represent labor availability.  
 Extension services, both private and public are expected to influence uptake. The questions on 
extension services did not focus on AES and were asked in a general way. It can be expected that 
information on AES are only part of these extension services.  Private extension follows from feed 
suppliers, banks, researchers, and processing industry. Public extension will also follow the complete 
range of governmental regulation including AES and therefore a positive influence is expected on the 
uptake of AES. Given the type of private extension (focused on general farming practices) it is 
expected that these will negatively influence the uptake of AES. A positive assessment of institutional 
design is expected to increase the uptake of AES.  
 Social capital is measured using the following indicators: (1) trust in general; (2) trust in the 
government (3) participation in social networks; (4) participation in agricultural networks. Higher 
levels of trust in general and trust in the government (as contracting partner) are also expected to 
increase the uptake. The social networks are more general networks not related to agriculture but for 
example to involvement in sports clubs. Agricultural networks focus on improving agricultural 
practices. The more general networks are thought to increase the probability of uptake AES because 
these farmers feel a large social responsibility. Participation in agricultural networks is expected to 
negatively influence uptake because the farmers are more oriented towards improving on agricultural 
operation.  
 
 
4. Empirical model 
 
 
In the empirical model we first have to derive the probabilities of contracting as a function of 
explanatory variables. From an econometric point of view there is no obvious solution for estimating a 
model where farms have more than one choice that do not exclude each other. 
A possibility would be to estimate a set of logit or probit models (see Verbeek, 2004: 190-192; 
Greene, 2008: 772-775) to determine the probabilities of contracting for each contract separately. So 
in case of selecting contract A, B or not contracting one estimates two logit or probit models (1) one 
for choosing contract A (and not choosing contract A) and one for (2) choosing contract B (and not 
choosing contract B). This would lead to a system of (two) equations. An alternative would be to 
estimate a multivariate probit model (see Greene, 2008: 826-831). With the multivariate probit model 
again there are several decisions, each between two alternatives. For each choice a probit model is 
estimated, however, it is assumed that the errors terms of the equations are correlated. This implies 
that there are unobserved variables affecting the choices made. In the logit, probit and multivariate 
probit model the explanatory variables can but are not necessarily identical between equations 
(choices made). So each choice can have its own explanatory variables.  
The disadvantage of the logit, probit and multivariate probit models for the purpose we want to 
use it is that probabilities are difficult to interpret because a normalisation of probabilities is missing 
(see Verbeek, 2004: 204-205). Each contract is compared to all other choices. In other words the 
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probability of choosing contract A cannot explicitly be linked to the probability of choosing contract 
B. In a multinomial logit model (see Verbeek, 2004: 208-210; Greene, 2003: 843-847) such a 
normalisation takes place because the probability of selecting a contract is determined relative to the 
probabilities of other possible choices (so all probabilities are known and can be related). Probabilities 
therefore also add up to 1. Disadvantage of the multinomial logit is that it assumes that one contract is 
selected (just as in a normal logit or probit). Running a multinomial logit for each choice separately is 
not an option because each choice is already compared to the other choices. We solved this problem 
by including a farm in the dataset for every time it selects a contract. So if a farm selects both contract 
A and B this farm appears twice in the dataset, one time selecting contact A and the other time 
contract B. This is similar to what we do when we estimate a set of logit or probit model or the 
multivariate probit model and assume that in each equation we have the same explanatory variables.  
With a multinomial logit function the probability that a farm i selects a contract (or not 
contracting) s ( )siγ  is given by: 
'
1
'
1
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s i
si S
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=
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 s S∈∀    0Sα =  (8) 
Where: 
sα vector of coefficients for contract s; ix vector of explanatory variables for farm i. 
 
In equation 8 coefficients are contract specific while the explanatory variables are identical for all 
contracts but their value is farm-specific. Equation 8 guarantees that the probabilities lie between 0 
and 1 and add up to 1. An assumption made when using the multinomial logit model is that it assumes 
that conditional upon observed characteristics the probabilities of any two alternatives are independent 
(the independence of the alternatives assumption, see Greene, 2008: 847). This is particularly 
troublesome if two or more alternatives are very similar. However, given that the alternative contracts 
are rather different (this is how they are defined, see data section) we maintain this assumption. This 
assumption is also made if we would estimate a system of logit or probit models or estimate the 
multivariate probit model. A Wald test confirms the independence of the alternatives assumption.  
Having estimated the probabilities to contract and assuming that these probabilities influence 
cost of contracting we can specify a farm and contract specific cost function. For the cost function in 
equation 4 we take the following function: 
[ ]1 1exp (1 )
(1 ) (1 )si si si sisi si si si
C Aγ βγ β γ β= − −− −    1s S∈ −∀  (9) 
Where: 
siβ  vector of farm and contract specific coefficients. 
 
Marginal cost equal: 
[ ]' exp (1 )si si si siC Aγ β= −      1s S∈ −∀  (10) 
We know that if a farm is contracting in the profit maximising optimum marginal revenue (contract 
payment) equals marginal cost. So, substituting marginal cost by contract payment sip  and solving for 
the optimal amount of land contracted gives: 
 
1 ln
(1 )si sisi si
A pγ β= −     1s S∈ −∀  (11) 
So the amount of land under contract s increases if the contract payment goes up (but with a 
decreasing rate) and the probability of selecting contract s increases. Notice that if contract payments 
are zero no land is contracted although there can be a positive probability of contracting land. Also in 
the multinomial logit there can be a positive probability to select a contract although a farm does not 
actually select that contract.  
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Equation 10 shows that contract payments should not be included in the multinomial logit 
model because marginal cost and contract payment are equal, and marginal costs are determined by 
the probabilities.   
The amount of land not contracted can be found by adding up the amounts of land under 
contract and subtracting this amount from the total amount of land: 
1
1
S
Si i si
s
A A A
−
=
= −∑  (12) 
For a farm contracting land we can derive the cost function (equation 9). For this we have to 
determine the value of siβ . Assuming that the actual amount of contracted land equals the utility 
maximizing amount of land and using equation 11 we can calculate the siβ ’s:  
1 ln
(1 )si sisi si
p
A
β γ= −  (13) 
The siβ ’s are coefficients of the contract and farm specific inverse marginal cost functions 
(the land allocation function, equation 12) that equalise the actual amount of land contracted with the 
calculated amount.   
 Equations 8-12 make it then possible to calculate, with changing exogenous variables 
(variables in vector ix , and contract payments) the optimal amount of land contracted. Using equation 
3 and 4 makes it possible to calculate changes in profit and utility. 
 
 
5. Estimation results 
 
 
Given that the estimates are difficult to interpret the marginal effects are calculated, see Table 2 
(estimation results are available upon request by the authors). They show how a small change in a 
variable affects the probabilities. In the case of dummy variables the marginal effects indicate the 
discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1. Marginal effects in Table 2 are calculated using 
averages for the explanatory variables. Marginal effects will differ between farms because the value of 
the explanatory variables will differ between farms. 
 
Landscape Management Contract 
Results indicate that selecting a Landscape Management Contract is positively influenced by a 
medium and high education level of the farmer and the participation of the farmer in non-agricultural 
organisations. Also trust in the government positively relates to selecting this type of contract. A 
relatively high education level, focus on non-agricultural activities, and trust in the government 
probably reflect an open attitude towards landscape and wildlife, and therefore, have a positive effect 
on participation.  
 The contract is selected less in case of beef farms and participation of the farmer in 
agricultural organisations. Also being an organic farm and making use of public extension negatively 
affect selecting a Landscape Management Contract. Participation of the farmer in agricultural 
organisations and making use of public extension could be indicators for a negative attitude of a 
farmer towards contracting (‘conservative’ farmers). The negative sign for organic farms could 
indicate that landscape management contracts and organic farming compete. Landscape Management 
Contracts imply relatively high marginal costs of farms (reflected by the relatively high contract 
payments) indicating it is a big step to select such a contract.  
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Table 2. Marginal effects calculated from the multinomial logit model for not contracting (not), 
Landscape Management Contract (land), Biodiversity Protection Contract (diversity) 
and Restriction on Intensive Practices Contract (intensive).  
 not land diversity intensive
Farm characteristics  
Percentage SGM in dairy production -0.000 0.000 0.002* -0.002*
Percentage SGM in beef production 0.001 -0.006* 0.004* 0.000
Farm size in SGM 0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
Dummy indicating whether farm is organic+ -0.160* -0.064* 0.044 0.181*
Number of technical changes -0.026* -0.001 0.009 0.018*
Dummy indicating whether farm is expected to 
be continued the next 10 years+ 
-0.014 -0.008 0.035 -0.014
Farmers’ characteristics  
Dummy age farmer between 40-55+ 0.087* -0.007 0.020 -0.100*
Dummy age farmer older than 55+ 0.068* 0.007 -0.017 -0.058*
Dummy indicating medium education level+ 0.021 0.028* -0.003 -0.046
Dummy indicating high education level+ -0.009 0.062* -0.024 -0.029
Dummy indicating whether off-farm income is 
more than 50% of total income+ 
-0.125* -0.003 0.042 0.087*
Institutional performance and trust  
Score on 6 items related to institutional design -0.158* 0.009 0.080* 0.068*
Dummy indicating the government can be trusted -0.050* 0.017* -0.017 0.050*
Dummy indicating AES will remain the same 
over time+ 
-0.072* 0.008 0.082* -0.018
Social capital  
Dummy indicating that most people can be 
trusted+ 
-0.011 -0.005 -0.017 0.033
Dummy indicating the farmer often participates 
in activities of non-agricultural organization+ 
-0.068* 0.033* 0.013 0.021
Dummy indicating the farmer often participates 
in activities of agricultural organization+ 
-0.084* -0.028* -0.015 -0.040
Extension services  
Dummy indicating use of public extension+ -0.131* -0.020* 0.042* 0.110*
Dummy indicating use of private extension+ 0.083* 0.009 -0.071* -0.021
*: Significant at 10% level. 
+: Marginal effects is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
 
 
Biodiversity Protection Contract 
The probability to select a Biodiversity Protection Contract is positively related to being a dairy or 
beef farm. The trust of the farmer in contract design and that the government will not change contract 
conditions in the future also positively relate to selecting this type of contract.  
 Making use of private extension services negatively affects contract choice while the use of 
public extension services has a positive effect.  
 The Biodiversity Protection Contract is relatively easy to implement on grassland, and 
therefore, dairy and beef farms are the obvious contractors. The more farmers trust the contract the 
more it is selected. Results suggest that this type of contract is chosen by  conservative farmers, a 
group that is probably using public extension services more than private extension services, that 
without too much extra costs can implement the contract. 
 
Restriction on Intensive Practises Contract 
The probability to select a contract imposing restrictions on intensive practises is positively affected 
by being an organic farm. This seems obvious given that organic farms are in general relatively 
extensive compared to regular farms. Probabilities are also positively affected when farmers have trust 
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in the government and contract design. Also off-farm income and the use of public extension services 
contribute to an increase in the probabilities that this contract is selected.  
 The probability that this type of contract is chosen decreases when the farm is a dairy farm 
and the farmer is old. Unexpectedly the probability also goes down when the farmer believes that there 
will be no time inconsistencies (contract terms will be changed over time). This is caused by the fact 
that farmers in that case choose for other contract types first (especially the Biodiversity Protection 
Contract). This is a consequence of using the multinomial logit model. Although there is a positive 
coefficient the sign could be negative in Table 2 because the estimated coefficient is small compared 
to the other coefficients. 
 
Not contracting 
The probability of not selecting a contract is positively influenced by being older, farm size (small 
effect) and using private extension services. It is negatively determined by being an organic farm, the 
number of technical changes adopted, trust in government and contract design, participation in 
agricultural and non-agricultural organisations, and the use of public extension services. These results 
are, not surprisingly, opposite to the reasons for selecting a contract. 
 
  
6. Simulations and results 
 
 
6.1 Scenarios 
 
 
To analyse how the government can increase participation in AES taking into account the competition 
between contracts there are three possible routes. First, the government can increase contract 
payments. This will lead ceteris paribus to an increase in participation. Second, is to change contract 
terms excluding contract payments, as contract duration and measures to be applied. Finally, the 
government can determine to influence factors that influence contract uptake but are not contract 
related. In terms of our model the first possibility can be analysed i.e. to increase the payments sip . 
The second possibility is impossible to analyse with our model because the exact contract conditions 
are not known because contracts analysed are groups of actual contracts. The latter possibility can be 
analysed by looking at the possible effects of changes in the variable that represents the perceived 
institutional design of contracts (which is not contract specific). Moreover, we analyse the possible 
effect of the variable that represents the trust of farmers that the government will not change contract 
terms during the course of the contract. So it is the trust farmers have that time inconsistency will not 
take place. The latter two variables might be influenced by the government by improving 
communication and being as transparent as possible. Increasing these variables implies an increase in 
the probability that a contract is selected. However, since the probabilities add up to one it could be 
that the increase of the amount of land selected for one contract is at the expense of the amount of land 
selected for another contract.  
 In order to analyse the effects of these variables we define three scenarios. Results of these 
scenarios will be compared with the base scenario. In the scenarios we determine contract choice for 
each individual farm in the sample (848 farms) using the model described in Section 4 (plus the 
estimated model of Section 5) and individual farm data from the sample. Notice that the outcomes of 
the model in the base scenario are exactly equal to the initial situation with respect to the farm specific 
amount of land selected for each contract. 
 
Scenario I: 
In order to look at the possible effects of an increase in payments we increase the payments for all 
three contracts by10%.  
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Scenario II: 
In order to look at the effects of an increase in perceived institutional performance we increase the 
variable representing trust in contractual design by 1. Since this variable represents a score on 6 items 
the total maximum value remains 6 (so there is no increase for farms already scoring the maximum 
value). This variable is not contract specific. 
 
Scenario III: 
In order to look at the effects of (perceived) time inconsistency for farms we change for those farms 
that have a value 0 for this dummy variable its value into 1. 
 
In the remaining Section results of the three scenarios are presented. Since it is not convenient to 
present the results for 848 farms we aggregate the outcomes for each country. 
 
 
6.2 Results 
 
 
Base scenario 
Results with respect to land allocation and profit for the base scenario are presented in Tables 3 and 4.  
 
Table 3. Initial allocation of land over contracts in shares (base scenario). 
 Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0.785 0.001 0.035 0.179 1
Finland 0.514 0.000 0.022 0.464 1
France 0.664 0.028 0.150 0.157 1
Italy 0.770 0.010 0.008 0.212 1
Netherlands 0.628 0.009 0.307 0.056 1
Total 0.693 0.012 0.105 0.191 1
 
 
Table 4. Initial profit per farm (base scenario). 
 Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0 15.45 348.41 917.46 1281.33
Finland 0 3.00 60.01 87.43 150.44
France 0 148.92 1790.64 1119.62 3059.18
Italy 0 471.91 377.07 1278.92 2127.90
Netherlands 0 199.15 996.69 989.54 2185.37
Total 0 153.46 862.40 955.78 1971.64
 
 
The land allocation (Table 3) reflects the actual land allocation. We see large differences between 
countries with respect to land allocation. However, in all countries most land is allocated to non-
contracting. The Restriction on Intensive Practices Contract is the second most important land 
allocation category (except for the Netherlands where the Biodiversity Protection Contract is most 
important) The Landscape Management Contract is least important for all countries except for Italy. 
Table 4 shows the profit earned with each contract. Profit is determined by land allocation (see Table 
3), contract payments, and probabilities to contract (higher probabilities, less costs, more profit). On 
average the contract payments are lowest for the Restriction on Intensive Practices Contract and the 
highest for the Landscape Management Contract. The Biodiversity Protection Contract takes an 
intermediate position. For the probabilities the opposite is the case. Profits show that high contract 
payments do not compensate for the higher costs. Profits are high for the Restriction on Intensive 
Practices Contract and Biodiversity Protection Contract. 
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Scenario 1: Increase in contract payments 
An increase in contract payments for one contract increases profit for that contract. However, 
probabilities of contracting do not change. This implies (see equation 7) that only for the contract that 
has become more profitable the amount of land contracted increases. This increase is at the expense of 
land that is previously not contracted. So in the model contract payments do influence the choice 
whether to contract or not but do not lead to competition between contracts. In Scenario 1 we 
increased contract payments for all three contracts with 10%. Table 5 and 6 show the effect on land 
allocation and profit respectively.  
 
Table 5. Change allocation of land over contracts in percentages of base scenario.  
Scenario 1: 10% increase in contract payments 
 Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium -0.71 1.49 1.74 2.78 0
Finland -8.54 1.64 3.64 9.29 0
France -1.29 4.13 2.15 2.65 0
Italy -0.52 1.35 1.58 1.77 0
Netherlands -1.31 1.87 2.28 2.00 0
Total -1.57 3.44 2.20 4.28 0
 
Table 6. Change profit per farm in percentages of base scenario. 
Scenario 1: 10% increase in contract payments 
 Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0 11.74 12.03 12.38 12.28
Finland 0 12.17 13.35 19.50 16.90
France 0 13.16 12.58 13.17 12.82
Italy 0 11.71 11.98 12.36 12.15
Netherlands 0 11.99 13.05 11.93 12.42
Total 0 12.20 12.55 12.66 12.56
 
 
Results indicate that especially for Finland the increase in contract payments for the Restriction on 
Intensive Practices Contract leads to a relatively large increase in land allocated to this contract and 
also results in a relatively large increase in profit. For all countries the increase in land allocated to a 
contract is less than 10% and in a large number of cases smaller than 2%. ‘Price elasticities’ of land 
contracted are therefore (much) smaller than one. However, profit increases are larger than 10%. With 
an increase in land allocated to a contract the extra revenue is larger than the extra cost (however in 
profit maximizing optimum marginal cost equal marginal revenue). The reason is that also for the land 
that was contracted before the contract payments increased revenue goes up.  
 
Scenario 2: Increase in institutional performance 
If the institutional performance is improved probabilities to contract land increase. This increase is the 
largest for the Biodiversity Protection Contract and the smallest for Landscape Management Contract. 
The Restriction on Intensive Practices Contract takes an intermediate position (see Table 2). The 
increases in probabilities lead to a decrease in marginal cost, and therefore, given the same contract 
payments, to a larger amount of land contracted (see equation 11, and Table 7).  
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Table 7. Change allocation of land over contracts in percentages of base scenario.  
Scenario 2: increase in institutional performance 
 Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium -2.40 2.45 12.74 8.00 0
Finland -9.25 0.18 6.62 9.94 0
France -5.23 1.18 13.96 8.53 0
Italy -3.56 1.61 9.43 12.48 0
Netherlands -8.55 0.86 16.44 5.66 0
Total -4.82 1.22 14.70 9.33 0
 
 
Table 8. Change profit per farm in percentages of base scenario. 
Scenario 2: increase in institutional performance 
 Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0 3.31 13.13 7.02 8.63
Finland 0 0.18 7.42 2.36 4.33
France 0 0.68 14.20 7.44 11.07
Italy 0 1.79 10.30 13.29 10.21
Netherlands 0 0.68 16.04 4.51 9.42
Total 0 1.28 14.08 8.05 10.16
 
 
Table 2 shows that the coefficients for the marginal effects are positive for all three contracts. This 
implies that the increase in the amount of land contracted is at the expense of the land that is initially 
not contracted. Cost curves are farm specific so the effects per farm differ in size. The outcomes per 
country show for example that the Biodiversity Protection contract is relatively important in France 
and the Netherlands. The increase in profit (see Table 8) for this type of contract is therefore also 
relatively large for these countries (cost decrease for all units of land already contracted). 
 
Scenario 3: No time inconsistency 
If there is no time inconsistency the probabilities to contract change but the change is not positive for 
every contract.  
 
 
Table 9. Change allocation of land over contracts in percentages of base scenario.  
Scenario 3: no perceived time inconsistency 
 Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0.33 2.40 5.55 -2.55 0
Finland 3.75 1.16 5.92 -4.43 0
France -1.81 0.90 9.54 -1.65 0
Italy 0.10 1.55 6.69 -0.66 0
Netherlands -5.67 0.82 12.25 -3.61 0
Total -0.87 1.01 10.21 -2.54 0
 
 
Table 10. Change profit per farm in percentages of base scenario. 
Scenario 3: no perceived time inconsistency 
 Not contracting Landscape management Biodiversity Intensity Total
Belgium 0 2.98 5.81 -3.35 -0.78
Finland 0 1.15 7.51 -3.05 1.25
France 0 0.51 10.37 -2.02 5.36
Italy 0 1.86 5.76 -0.84 0.93
Netherlands 0 0.73 12.04 -3.67 3.90
Total 0 1.27 9.81 -2.39 3.23
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Although the coefficientα  for time consistency in equation 8 is positive for every contract the 
probability of selecting an individual contract can decrease because the relative increase can be 
smaller than for the other contracts. Table 3 shows that the marginal effect for the Restriction on 
Intensive Practices Contract is negative. Table 3 represents average effects and in the simulation 
model the marginal effects differ between farms and also do not necessary have the same sign for one 
type of contract. Results show indeed that with no time inconsistency less land is allocated to the 
Restriction on Intensive Practices Contract and more to the Biodiversity Protection Contract and to a 
lesser extent the Landscape Management Contract (see Table 9). We also see a small decrease in the 
land not contracted although the average marginal effect in Table 3 has a (small) positive sign. Besides 
the increase in the amount of land allocated to the Biodiversity Protection Contract and Landscape 
Management Contract profit from both contracts increases (see Table 10). Overall there is an increase 
in profit. However, for some farms profit exactly falls (see also average for Belgium). This unexpected 
result comes from the fact that a farm shifts from a contract with an initial high profit but now low 
profit (because of a lower probability) to a contract that now has a high profit but had a low profit 
(because of a higher probability). However the new profit is lower than old profit, decreasing overall 
profit.  
 
 
7. Discussion and conclusions 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse agri-environmental contract uptake taking into account 
institutional issues, farm and farmers’ characteristics and competition between contracts. To reach this 
goal a model that allocates land between competing agri-environmental contracts for individual farms 
has been developed.  
In the model utility from profit earned with contracting is maximised. Profit is defined as the 
revenue from contracting (contract payments times the amount of land contracted) minus costs. Costs 
are actual and perceived costs of contracting like opportunity costs of contracted land, transaction 
costs, costs to be made to fulfil contract requirements. Since data on perceived and actual costs of 
contracting are lacking a farm-specific exponential cost function is specified. The cost function runs 
through two points: no contracting gives zero costs and the point where marginal cost equal contract 
payments (marginal revenue). Costs are assumed to decrease when the probability of contracting is 
higher. This probability depends on farm household characteristics, farm characteristics, institutional 
performance and trust, social capital and the use of extension services. All these variables are assumed 
to relate to both perceived and actual costs of contracting. 
As expected we find that an increase in contract payments increases the amount of land 
contracted. In the model a change in contract payments for one contract only increases the amount of 
land under that specific contract (at the costs of the area not contracted). We also find that an 
improvement in institutional performance of contracts increases the amount of land contracted. It is 
not possible to analyse the effects of institutional performance of individual contracts because the 
contracts simulated are aggregates of real contracts and the contracts are of similar institutional design. 
Real contracts however would not change the basic message of this paper and would require a larger 
number of observations. A change in institutional performance increases especially the land allocated 
to the Biodiversity Protection Contract and to a lesser extent the amount of land allocated to the 
Restriction on Intensive Practises Contract. A reduction in time inconsistency increases the amount of 
land contracted allocated to the Biodiversity Protection Contract and Landscape Management Contract 
but decreases the amount of land allocated to the Restriction on Intensive Practises Contract. This is 
caused by the fact that the increase in probabilities (and associated cost reduction) for the first two 
contracts is at the expense of the Restriction on Intensive Practises Contract.  
A caveat of the model is that contracts that in the dataset are not selected will not be selected in 
the simulations because it was not possible to specify the farm and contract cost function. Despite this 
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caveat the model is a flexible tool to study contract choice because it includes a wide variety of 
explanatory variables in combination with utility maximising behaviour of farmers.  
 This paper indicates that it is important to study the choice for an agri-environmental contract 
in combination with the choice for other agri-environmental contracts. Reducing time inconsistency 
can e.g. lead to the unexpected result that the choice for an agri-environmental contract decreases 
because other agri-environmental contracts become more attractive. This implies that in order to 
design effective and efficient policies knowledge about locally existing agri-environmental policies, 
farming systems and preferences of farmers is needed. 
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